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POINT I
LUCKY SEVEN APPEALS FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS
ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY,
The Respondent's brief is noteworthy
First, it totally

fails to respond

in two respects.

to any of the Appellant's

issues raised on appeal, and second, it lacks any citation to the
record to support any of its assertions.
The

Respondent's

brief

appears

to be based

upon

the

assumption that the lower Court's Summary Judgment is grounded on
findings of fact.
argues

that

the

(Respondent's Brief P. 7)
trial

court's

pivotal

Clark, further,

rulings, or

so called

findings, that the "sole purpose" of the easement was to maintain
and operate a dike and

reservoir, and that other uses of the

easement were "predicated" on the continued use of the property
as

a

dike

and

reservoir,

are

supported

by

the

record.

(Respondent's Brief P. 8)

Clark's brief, however, glosses the

critical

Seven

fact

that

Lucky

is

appealing

from

a

Summary

Judgment, and not from a judgment entered after trial in which
the finder-of-fact might have weighed
findings.

Clark's

brief

the evidence and entered

ignores Lucky

Seven's

argument

that

because the intents and reasons of the parties for granting the
easement

are

disputed,

these

questions

could

not be properly

resolved by Summary Judgment. Owen v. W. H. Westerhaus, 224 Kan.
42, 578 P.2d 1102 (1978).
Clark alleges that the trial court made certain findings
which are entitled

to an inference of validity.
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(Respondent's

brief, P. 7-8)

While Lucky Seven does not dispute that findings

are entitled to an inference, Lucky Seven urges that the rule is
inapposite in this case.
A review of the record shows that no findings entitled
to an inference of validity were entered.
tried

The original lawsuit,

in December, 1984, was resolved by Stipulation.

quently the Court entered an Order and Judgment.
fact were entered.
Judgment

alleging

Subse-

No findings of

In 1985, Pat Clark filed a Motion for Summary
conduct

inconsistent

alleging an abandonment thereof.

with

(R. 180)

the

easement

and

Lucky Seven filed an

Affidavit in opposition to the Motion admitting removal of a dike
and reservoir, but denying any intent to abandon the easement, or
that the easement required that the property be used as a dike
and

reservoir.

(R. 186-190)

The Affidavit

removal of a fence, but alleges

also admits

that the fence was on Lucky

Seven's property, and denies that the particular
was

a

fence

required

to

be

the

maintained

by

fence removed

the

Order

and

Judgment.
*

When the lower court ordered Summary Judgment for Clark,

Lucky Seven requested Findings.
on

Summary

previously

Judgment
expressed

therefore, Lucky

(Rule
its

Seven

While findings are not necessary

52,

URCP),

intent

desired

to

that

the

enter

trial
Summary

the Court

court

had

Judgment,

articulate

the

nature of any ambiguity it had found in the Order and Judgment,
and also describe what evidence the Court had relied upon to find
an intent to abandon. (R. 207-209).

Lucky Seven urges that these
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so-called

findings are not entitled to presumption of validity

since the trial court was not procedurely in a position to weigh
the disputed factual questions on Summary Judgment.
In 1986, two years after trial, and without the benefit
of a transcript, the District Court stated that according to his
recollection, the

sole purpose

of

the easement was to enable

Lucky Seven to maintain and operate the dike and reservoir for
the benefit of abutting agricultural property.
been

characterized

as

a Finding.

The

The statement has

so-called

finding

is

disputed by the Affidavits on Summary Judgment. (R. 186-190)
In his brief Clark

attempts

to justify

trial court's

ruling that the purpose of the easement was to maintain and operate the dike and

reservoir, claiming

that the Court made

its

finding based on its knowledge of the facts and evidence presented at trial.

(Respondent's Brief, P.7)

Curiously, however,

the brief makes no reference to the transcript of the trial to
support the Courtfs knowledge.
to the trial transcript

Obviously, there is no reference

in Clark's brief because

support in the transcript for such a statement.

there

is no

The trial court

could not have gotten its "sole purpose" or sole reason idea from
the transcript, because it does not exist therein.

Rather, the

evidence at trial supports multiple uses and purposes for the
easement property.
minimize

At trial, Clark's counsel even attempted to

the necessity

for use of the property

for irrigation

purposes which Respondent now claims was the sole purpose of the
grant of easement. (R. 127:2-19)
- 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-

Clark's brief makes the equally unsupported and erron-

eous statement that the 1986 Findings are set forth in the 1984
Order and Judgment. (Respondent's Brief, P. 7)

Again, there is a

glaring paucity of any citation to the record.
Judgment

says nothing

The Order and

about the purposes of the easement, nor

does the Order and Judgment state or imply that the easement was
granted solely to allow operation of a reservoir and dike as the
District Court later said in 1986.

Rather, multiple purposes and

uses, including agricultural uses, are specifically authorized.
On Summary Judgment Clark claimed that Lucky Seven was
required

to continue

to operate a dike and

reservoir.

Lucky

Seven, for its part, denied this intent, and alleged that many
alternative
Had

there

uses were
been

a

intended

trial,

the

to be permitted.

(R. 186-190)

Court

weighed

could

have

evidence, entered a judgment and made findings.

the

However, Summary

Judgment should have been denied, since the intentions and understandings of the parties were material and disputed.

The Court's

so called "Findings" on the basis of disputed Affidavits, are not
entitled to any inference of validity.

POINT II
IT IS A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT WHETHER LUCKY SEVEN
REMOVED ANY FENCE REFERRED TO IN THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Paragraph 3 of the Order and Judgment
that the Plaintiff, Lucky
fences enclosing

(R. 157} states

Seven, had a duty to "maintain the

the area hereinabove

described."
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Obviously,

particular fences were contemplated to be maintained.
Pat Clark alleges that the fences enclosing the easement
area have been removed.

Clark also alleges that this "fact" is

uncontroverted. (Respondent's Brief, P.4)
In his Affidavit in opposition to Summary Judgment Lucky
Seven's president, Russel Walter, stated:
13. There are several fences which could be
interpreted
as enclosing
the easement
property.
14. Two such fences are located on the boundary of Defendant's property.
One of
these fences separates Defendant's property and the easement property.
15. The Plaintiff has removed a third fence,
which fence was located on the Plaintiff's
property, and not on the disputed property.
Said fence is not part of the
easement.
•>•

r

16. The fence removed by the Plaintiff does
not demark any meaningful boundary or
control cattle, and has no function or
use, but presents an obstruction to the
Plaintiff's use of the property.
There is no dispute that Lucky Seven removed a fence on
its own property.
whether

However, there is a material factual dispute

the fence removed

easement area to which

is one of the fences enclosing

the Order and Judgment refers.

the

It is

disputed whether Lucky Seven had an obligation to maintain the
removed fence.

Lucky Seven alleges that the fence removed is on

Lucky Seven's property, is not one of the fences enclosing the
easement

and

served

no

purpose.

Obviously,

the

Order

and

Judgment does not require maintenance of every fence, but only

- 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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specific fences enclosing the easement area.
fence removed

is in issue and

should

The identity of the

have been determined

by

trial rather than Summary Judgment.
<

•'••

,

"

, .

'

•

: "

' • • . • ' ; C - - . : " -

: :

r

-

•

'
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POINT III
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A PERMANENT OBSTRUCTION
OF THE EASEMENT WARRANTING THE RULING OF ABANDONMENT.
There is no dispute that Lucky Seven removed an earthen
dike on the easement property.

Lucky Seven argued in it's brief

that Lucky Seven's admitted conduct in preparing the easement for
planting,

an

agricultural

purpose,

approved uses of the easement.

was

consistent

with

the

Further, Lucky Seven argued that

in spite of its admitted removal of the dike, there was no clear
or unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon the easement.
Timpanogas-Hiland, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d

481, (Utah

1975).

Pat Clark's brief fails to address either of these issues.
Pat Clark argues in his brief that Lucky Seven's removal
of the reservoir and dike is evidence of an intent to abandon the
easement.
obstructs
destroy

According to Clark, Lucky Seven's conduct permanently
the

use of

the easement.

the easement

and

displays

an

intent

to

Clark's brief, however, candidly admits

that it must be "assumed" that removal of the dike and reservoir
is a permanent obstruction of the easement. (Respondent's Brief,
P. 10)

There

is no testimony

or evidence

in the record

that

removal of the earthen dike or reservoir by Lucky Seven created
any permanent obstruction to the use of the easement.

- 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There is evidence and testimony in the record that the
configuration of the dike and reservoir had changed over time,
and that removal or alteration created no permanent impediment.
Russ Walter testified he had built a smaller dike and pond inside
the larger major pond areaf and was apparently using the same at
the time of trial. (RT. 33:18-19; 34:10-15)

This smaller pond

did not utilize the dike which was later removed. Thus, a pond
for

irrigation

or other

purposes

had

been, and

could

in the

future, be created on the easement property even though the dike
previously part of the larger pond had been removed to accomodate
planting.

Lucky Seven alleged in its Affidavit in Opposition to

Summary Judgment, that a "reservoir could still be maintained on
the

property,

property.

should

the

Plaintiff

so

elect

to

use

the

Plaintiff does intend to construct a smaller pond for

Plaintiff's stock watering purposes on the property at a future
date."
removal

(R. 187, Paragraph
or

construction

7).

There is no evidence that the

of an earthen

dike

and pond

permanent consequences on the use of the easement.

has any
There

is

evidence that the contrary is true.
The

Stipulation

construction of a pipeline
Seven's

abutting

of

the

for pressurized

agricultural

pipeline was to be constructed
Seven, and would

parties

property.

contemplated

the

irrigation of Lucky

(R.

153, % 4 ) . This

by and was to belong to Lucky

not benefit Pat Clark.

(R. 180, 11 12)

The

Appellant alleges that Clark was aware and understood that upon
installation of a pipeline the alternative use of the easement
- 7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for

a

dike

alternative

and

reservoir

uses.

contructed.

(R.

would

187,

be

eliminated,

1[ 6)

This

leaving

pipeline

has

only
been

It is located where the larger irrigation pond had

previously been.

The contemplated construction of this pipeline

further emphasizes the intent of the parties that the easement
have multiple uses, and underscores the intent of Lucky Seven to
relocate a pond on the easement as stated in its Affidavit.
Appellant thus disputes that the removal of the earthen
dike created

any permanent destruction of the purposes of the

easement, and

further

create

on

a pond

alleges

that

the easement

it, in

area.

fact, intended

Thus, the

"assumption" that the removal of the dike and

to

Respondent's

reservoir

is a

permanent obstruction is not supported by the record, but is a
disputed issue of fact which should have been reserved for trial.

POINT IV
LUCKY SEVEN'S REMOVAL OF THE DIKE AND RESERVOIR
IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF AN
INTENT TO ABANDON THE EASEMENT
The Respondent's brief alleges that removal of the dike
and reservoir on the easement property is sufficient evidence to
find an abandonment.

Respondent cites Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13

Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962).
and

should

be

closely

landowners, alleged

The Harmon case is instructive

reviewed.

In

that Harmons had

Harmon

the

abandoned

easement for a ditch over the Rasmussen property.

Rasmussens,

a prescriptive
The evidence

supporting abandonment came from two neighbors who alleged that
' - 8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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they had lived in the area for six years, but had seen no water
running through the ditch at any time.
that Harmon

had piled

dirt

There was also testimony

in the North branch of the ditch

around the headgate to prevent the water from being turned into
the ditch by children removing the headgate board when the water
was not wanted in the ditch.

After reviewing these factsf this

Court

abandonment

stated

that

"proof

of

of

such

an

easement

requires action releasing the ownership and the right to use with
clear and convincing proof of an intentional abandonment.

This

requires that Plaintiff ceased to use this easement to irrigate
their land with the intention to make no further use of it."
at 765.

Id.

See also Brown v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 36

Utah 257, 102 P. 740 (1909).
Lucky Seven urges that there is no clear and convincing
proof of an intent to abandon the easement and make no further
use of it.

Lucky Seven clearly believed that it had the right to

use the property for agricultural purposes, including planting,
which had been been a historical use of the property. (RT. 34:1720)

Lucky Seven removed an earthen dike and reservoir, which

configuration had been previously altered and changed (RT. 34:1415),

and

alleged

that

it

intended

to later construct

smaller pond on the easement property.

(R. 186-190)

another
The test

established by the Harmon Court was whether owner of the easement
had indicated by its conduct, clear and convincing intention to
make "no further use" of the easement.

There is no evidence in

this case that Lucky Seven intended to make no further use of the
- 9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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easement.

On

easement
intent

for

in

construct
evidence

the contrary, Lucky
agricultural

its Affidavit
a new pond

Seven

purposes, but
in Opposition

on

intended
further

to use the
expressed

an

to Summary Judgment to

the easement property.

Neither

the

in the record of the trial or the Affidavits of the

parties in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment supports
the allegation

that there is any clear or convincing evidence

that Lucky Seven intended to make no further proper use of the
easement property.

POINT V
TERMINATION OF THE EASEMENT IS EXCESSIVELY HARSH
AND OPPRESSIVE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES,
Lucky Seven believes that when viewed^ in light of all
of the circumstances, the Court's termination of the easement for
its conduct, even if a breach of the easement agreement exists
(which it denies), was punative and inappropriate.
A brief summary of the circumstances that suggest a more
appropriate

resolution

is

warranted.

Lucky

Seven

reasonably

believed that the language of the easement allowed an agricultural use in planting. (R. 188, 11 9-10)

When this interpretation

was disuted, Clark sought a judicial interpretation of the easement.

Instead of an interpretation with clarifying or remedial

orders, the Court entered Summary Judgment.
There

is no evidence that the removal of the earthen

reservoir created any permanent or serious obstruction that could

- 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not have been remedied had the trial Court merely clarified the
permitted uses of the easement and instructed Lucky Seven accordingly.
There

is no evidence

in the record of any damage or

disadvantage flowing to Pat Clark as a result of Lucky Seven's
use of the property.

The maintenance of the reservoir f when

filled with water, was to irrigate Lucky Seven's land, not Pat
Clark's land.

Pat Clark would not benefit from this use since he

had no water and did not have the right to store water in the
reservoir in any event. (R. 188, 11 12)
Since Clark could not be damaged, there was no reason
that the trial Court could not have interpreted the easement and
made

remedial orders.

A more appropriate

solution would have

been entry of an appropriate order requiring restoration of the
dike,

supported

by an Order

to Show Cause

should not thereafter be ordered or damages.
order

terminating

why

an

injunction

The entry of an

the easement under these circumstances, how-

ever, offends justice and equity and should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The issues raised by Lukcy Seven's appellate brief have
two primary thrusts.
entered

in

First that the Consent Order and Judgment

1984 expressly

permitting

alternative

uses of the

easement property does not require that the property be used as a
reservoir and dike.

Secondly, the intents of the parties regard-

ing the use or abandonment of the easement are all disputed by
- 11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Affidavits offered

on Summary Judgment, thereby making a

Summary Judgment inappropriate as a matter of law.

Respondent

has not addressed the issues raised by Lucky Seven's brief.
Clark chooses to ignore the issues raised by Lucky Seven
as

well

as

the

clear

language

of

the

Order

and Judgment.

Instead, Clark relies wholly on the unsupported recollections and
pronouncements of the District Court made two years later.
The Respondent's argument that removal of the dike and
reservoir

creates a permanent obstruction to the easement is

founded on unsupported "assumptions" and should be rejected.
The

argument

made

in

the

Respondent's

brief

that

deference should be given to the lower court's findings would be
appropriate had this matter gone to trial in 1986.

However,

where Summary Judgment was entered the reverse is true, and all
inferences and deference should be given to the party against
whom Motion for Summary Judgment was made.

Under all of the

circumstances and the language of the Consent Order and Judgment,
termination of the easement is an unfair and excessively harsh
remedy which should be reversed.
DATED this /XT^I day of December, 1986.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
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~/'Timothy
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Dale R. Chamberlain
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